The White House AI Memo: A Blueprint for Global Competition
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On October 24, 2024, the White House issued a Memorandum on Advancing the United States’ Leadership in Artificial Intelligence. This document is not only an important indicator of the U.S. government's thinking on AI but is also likely to influence how other governments respond. It encapsulates various considerations from the perspective of a developer and tech-advancing nation. In many ways, it serves as a general blueprint of what we can expect from governmental approaches.
We began the year with governments discussing a collaborative, mutual assistance approach within intergovernmental organizations. Early rhetoric in forums such as the UN General Assembly and the Summit of the Future emphasized working together for the common good, sharing technology, capacity, and know-how. However, as anticipated, these sentiments quickly dissipated when the real implications of AI technology became clear.
So, what does this memo tell us about the outlook of the US government when it comes to AI, and what will the impact and implications of this outlook be on the global arena?
Key Priorities and National Security: The U.S. Approach to AI Governance
There was no doubt, from the inception of this technology, that security and defense would be a primary lens through which it is approached. Its predictive and processing capabilities have the potential to amplify abilities of governments many times over, and its access to unfathomable amounts of information make it an incredibly useful and dangerous tool at the same time.
The memo makes it clear that the U.S. government is highly aware of AI's potential risks, including data access, policy prediction, and the ability to map out complex strategies. It also reflects an awareness of the potential vulnerability of the emerging US AI ecosystem to infiltration and attack and encompasses an overview of preemptive measures to preempt these potentialities. While aiming to protect U.S. AI infrastructure from foreign interference and malicious operations, the memo outlines a strategy to attract and retain top global talent.
We can also infer from this memo that the private sector is in the lead in this field; the memo repeatedly emphasizes this issue and positions the U.S. government's role as the central coordinator within the domestic AI ecosystem, providing support, oversight, and engagement.
Another key takeaway is the foresight demonstrated in government restructuring. The U.S. is not simply looking at integration of AI into its systems, but also actively modifying its institutional frameworks. The memo highlights a considerable degree of institutional agility on the part of the government; not only is it integrating AI into its current systems but it is also incorporating AI into the planning for new facilities, and into any updates and renovations of existing structures and systems. It further highlighted the growing role of the AI Safety Institute as an oversight body, as well as the integration of Chief AI Officers across US governmental institutions.
To maintain accountability and reduce the risk of decisions made purely by AI, the memo mandates the permanent presence of humans in the chain of command. This is particularly relevant when it comes to matters of military and security applications of the technology.
Additionally, the memo underscores the importance of cross-agency governance and inter-operability. The U.S. is structuring its AI oversight and governance to be adaptive, acknowledging the need for continuous updates to keep pace with rapid technological advancements.
The document leaves little to the imagination when it comes to the US approach on the international arena when it comes to AI; it is unambiguous in its competitive outlook. It emphasizes U.S. leadership in AI and explicitly warns against losing ground to strategic competitors. The rhetoric is not about shared progress, as the UN resolutions and summits would have had us believing, but about maintaining U.S. primacy, with a direct link to foreign policy objectives.
The memo frames the US perspective on the issue of AI as being an ‘us or them’ issue, where shared and collaborative approaches take second place to competitive strategies. This already came into play in practice last April when the US commerce secretary told the UAE that “when it comes to emerging technology, you cannot be both in China’s camp and our camp.”
On the multilateral level, the US seems focused on developing frameworks and norms according to its foreign policy directives, that the memo indicates includes matters of democracy, human rights, international law, efforts to prevent ‘the unchecked spread of digital authoritarianism,’ and ‘the misuse of AI in national security contexts.’
While this brief background sheds light on some of the salient points that I will discuss and explore further, for a more detailed breakdown of the lengthy document, read the Center for Strategic and Security Studies (CSIS) analysis here.
Democracy & Human Rights in the Global AI Ecosystem
When the White House issues a document like this, the world pays attention. It will be studied in depth and detail and detail by governments the world over. It may even serve as a blueprint for other governments in developing their own outlooks toward the technology, particularly the sections on the methodology of integration and institutional adaptation. Beyond that there are several issues raised by this memo that may elicit reactions from governments.
At the outset, repeated references to the protection of human rights, democratic values, the prevention of digital authoritarianism, and the misuse of AI in national security contexts is likely to raise concerns across the board in the Global South. Those terms have come to be broadly interpreted as ‘excuses for intrusion,’ largely contingent on whether or not the US government views the government as allied or not.
Rather than reading as genuine concern about human rights, this will probably be interpreted as a tool for of political leverage against governments that defy US policy, to be used in times of dispute or disagreement in a manner similar to how the US government uses economic sanctions and aid as tools of exerting political influence.
With something as pervasive as AI, over dependency on US AI systems could be considered highly risky, given the potential for disruption in cases of policy disagreements, particularly with such flexible terms as ‘democratic values’ and ‘misuse’. This could incentivize governments in the Global South to hedge their bets against this sort of system, given the associated strategic risks of susceptibility to intrusion under pretexts of protecting vague ‘values’ or to prevent alleged ‘misuse’ of the systems.
In the current geopolitical context, the Global South is actively working to mitigate the risks associated with U.S. hegemony, such as through the BRICS 2024 initiative to move away from dollar dependency. Given these efforts, it is unlikely that these nations will fully embrace a U.S.-structured AI system that would consolidate a similar dependency in the digital realm given the risks that this dependency would carry; even allies of the US are not spared the hammer of sanctions as recent sanctions on Indian firms illustrate.
Gatekeeping and Global Skepticism
The memo repeatedly emphasizes that the US, as a matter of foreign policy, seeks to shape the international AI framework, and the norms and standards governing it. While in and of itself, this issue does not necessarily stand out, when coupled with the focus on counter intelligence, protectionist policies, and the stated intention of the US to maintain the competitive advantage when it comes to AI, the picture changes shape.
With those elements in mind, the US approach to international frameworks will be expected to serve its competitive interests. It would be expected to feature considerable gatekeeping measures that, from the perspective of emerging economies, will serve as a glass ceiling perpetuating their state of dependency and broadening rather than narrowing the digital divide.
An international AI cooperation dynamic led by the US would therefore be tinged with suspicion of being rigged against smaller players in the AI space, magnifying the advantages of countries leading the development of the technology, while amplifying the disadvantages of developing nations.
In the presence of alternative approaches, such as the one proposed by China on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September (link to the china meeting), the prospect of an exclusionary international cooperation framework would be considerably less attractive.
The Chinese government -and others- could therefore be expected to capitalize on this element of the memo in its outreach to countries in the Global South, emphasizing the difference of their approach that would allegedly be more inclusive of the concerns of their partners. In differentiating between the top-down cooperative approach of the US and the possibly more collaborative model offered by China, the latter may appear more attractive to prospective partners.
Compounding the matter, if we weave the repeated references in the memo to democracy and the misuse of AI in national security, the interpretation of the US strategy in shaping international cooperation frameworks when it comes to AI becomes even more complex. In addition to the possible inclusion of gatekeeping measures, the presence of flexible terms open to interpretation such a democracy and misuse of AI within global frameworks could face resistance.
Based on precedents of the use of human rights and democracy as a tool of political leverage, this might be another disincentive for governments to engage with a global framework and system led and constructed by the US. This could once again afford China and other potential rivals in the AI space to gain support for alternative frames of engagement that do not carry this kind of associated risk.
Talent Tug of War: The Global AI Race
The UN resolutions in March and July, as well as the final report of the AI Advisory Body, and other documents issued in multilateral contexts over the course of this year reference the importance of sharing knowledge and capacity building for developing countries. These rose colored outlooks did not materialize.
"As discussed in earlier pieces, countries and corporations will likely be hesitant to share their talent pools, or provide skill support for no tangible returns. The way that the US phrased it in this memo will be echoed throughout other governmental halls across the world in one form or another; identifying, attracting and securing AI talent will require considerable investment of time and resources, and the thought that they would then simply transfer this talent back is not backed by either government or corporate precedent behavior.
In this tug of war, the primary losers are expected to be the countries from which this talent will be drained; developing countries, with scant hope of competing in terms of incentives with wealthier nations, will find their talent pool dried up, exacerbating an already disparate berth of talent between them. This will further entrench the existing digital divide due to the lack of human resources capable of effectively driving forward local AI ecosystems.
A Zero Sum Game: A Fragmented Future in AI Governance
This memo is a symptom rather than a cause. State behavior is largely motivated by self interest, there was no reason to believe that the field of AI would be any different. A technology that could drive paradigm shifts, accelerate data processing, develop predictive models and amplify the capacities of governments to wield influence, and magnify the effectiveness and reach of their weapons is unlikely to foster cooperation.
Governance and management of AI has taken second place to achieving primacy in the field, with the competition between governments and corporations focused on access to and development of more powerful AI, and leadership of the international cooperation frameworks connected to the technology.
With tech leading nations, particularly the US and China, maneuvering to be the main partner for developing and emerging economies on AI, the focus on international cooperation is not geared toward shared success but rather advantageous positioning. As we mentioned earlier , being the first provider of the technology gives the advantage of entrenching cooperation and reliance, increasing the likelihood of prolonged use of the technology.
The lack of a current framework or governance mechanism will factor into the competition, providing free reign for rival governments to leverage the tools at their disposal during this timeframe to become primary partners on AI for developing nations.
This memo has made it clear that the US, one of the major actors in the realm of AI, is approaching this matter with a competitive, zero sum approach; it seeks leadership in the technology itself, and leadership in setting the ground rules of cooperation on the international arena.
The memo has also made it abundantly clear that the US, while agile and adaptable and innovative in its approach to the technology itself, remains committed to the same methods of engagement on the international level. It has maintained its adversarial approach, drawing lines between itself, its allies, and potential competitors and rivals.
It has also kept the same tools it has relied on over the last decades of its international engagement, such as spreading democratic values and preventing authoritarianism, all of which ring hollow and give potential partners pause when it comes to building partnerships with the US on the technology. The potential for cooperation to have strings attached to it, as well as possible kill switches based on political inclinations are not strong selling points, particularly in the presence of alternatives.
With intensifying competition between the US and China, emerging economies are expected to hedge their bets and reduce the risk of over reliance on one or the other. Even with the attempts by the US to frame the issue as ‘either you are with us or with them’, as they did in April with the UAE, it is unlikely that countries will fall in line.
The competitive drive and the increasing polarization on AI will likely be driven in part by intelligence considerations and on the other by the need to preserve proprietary technology.
These concerns will also place limitations on the cooperative frameworks alluded to in international forums. Discussions about sharing knowhow and transfer of technology bear little weight when contrasted with the desire to protect investment and sensitive technological information and technology. Cooperation and rivalry on AI will likely follow a similar model as the field of cybersecurity, with concerns about security taking precedence over incentives for collaboration.
The increased prioritization of protecting classified and proprietary AI information, combined with aggressive talent recruitment strategies, will exacerbate the brain drain from developing countries. They will find themselves lacking not only in infrastructure and resources, but also in the human capital needed to develop their own systems. The risk of over reliance on the AI systems of developed nations is considerable and will require careful planning and implementation to counter. We may even see national security policies being put in place to prevent the emigration of talent if the pattern becomes overly disruptive.
The fragmented approach to cooperation and the binary attitudes of leading nations may result in a divided, weakened, and ineffective international AI cooperation system. The priority for governments at this stage is not on finding ways to work together, but rather on positioning themselves to maximum advantage on the international arena. For developed countries the priority will be to secure as many partners as possible, while reducing the chances for their rivals to enter those same markets.
The White House AI memo marks a turning point in how global powers -not only the US- approach artificial intelligence. Framing the AI outlook within national security imperatives, and emphasizing a zero-sum competition signals a shift from earlier collaborative aspirations to a landscape defined by strategic positioning and technological dominance.
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