Rigidity and Bureaucratic Inertia: How Not to Approach Foreign Policy

Rigidity and Bureaucratic Inertia: How Not to Approach Foreign Policy
Mohammed Elsoukkary |

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Adaptability, dynamism, agility. All features of an effective foreign policy in a rapidly shifting global landscape. Paradoxically, these qualities are often absent from the large bureaucratic institutions that shape international relations.

The global arena is witnessing a shift in pace and direction that predicates a change in the institutions that shape it, yet many of them seem to be wading through the currents of the evolving landscape rather than riding them. In transformational periods, those who fail to adapt to changes will lag behind, trying to catch up rather than shaping the transformation to their needs.

As such, this is a time for governments to take stock of how they manage their foreign policy portfolios and ask themselves whether they are effectively wielding the tools at their disposal to achieve their goals and protect their interests, particularly in a time of shifting power balances, emerging challenges, and technological advancements such as AI, all contributing to a paradigm shift in the global landscape.

Identifying the root causes of stagnating foreign policy is the first step toward resolution. This piece introduces key issues, with future discussions delving deeper into solutions.

The Impact of Poorly Formulated Foreign Policy

Foreign policy forms an integral part of overall government strategy, and has far reaching impact on every aspect of the state of internal affairs in any country. A well-structured foreign policy can enhance trade, attract investments, predict threats, develop partnerships, and open doors for opportunities, to name a few. On the other hand, a poorly formulated or implemented foreign policy can become a government’s bane. 

Failure to adjust foreign policy to a changing international landscape can erode a nation’s ability to safeguard its interests. It can result in a regression of economic development, expose a country to unexpected threats, and impact its political standing, opening it up to pressures that run contrary to its strategic goals.

To illustrate the dangers of a rigid foreign policy, consider the hypothetical nation of “Fictionistan”, a nation with strong partnerships in countries rich in natural resources. Over time, it neglects to update its foreign policy, relying on old mechanisms of engagement. Meanwhile, its partners, seeking new opportunities, begin to favor Fictionistan’s competitors, who offer more attractive models of cooperation. As Fictionistan clings to outdated foreign policies, it witnesses a regression of its international trade and influence, reducing its access to resources in favor of its competitors. Gradually, the trickle down effects of this poorly formulated foreign policy affects its internal economic status, and affecting its industries, which in turn affect its ability to compete on the international economic arena. Much like a domino starting a chain reaction, the inflexible approach to international relations begins a chain of internal decline for Fictionistan.

The oversimplified hypothetical serves to illustrate how an inability of a government to adapt its foreign policy can result in the accumulation of challenges on multiple fronts both internal and external. Some governments make that mistake, falling into the trap of taking their foreign policy approaches for granted and insisting on them rather than taking steps to evolve.

The damage to states as a result of myopic foreign policy is not limited to lost economic opportunities. It can have far reaching effects and impose devastating opportunity costs on states that fail to recognize shifting alliances and balances of power. In subsequent pieces we will explore examples of how this can manifest on the global arena.

The pitfalls of rigid foreign policy are evident to operators in the field, underscoring the necessity of constant adaptation. It is a talking point that is repeated in government meetings across the world, and yet the pattern of complacency remains, indicating that it may not be a simple matter of theoretical awareness of the problem but rather a matter of causal variables operating in that may not be readily apparent.

Progressive Decline

If operators in the field of international affairs are aware of the threats posed to their countries’ interests by ill-fated foreign policies and decisions, it would seem logical that they would take active steps to preempt and address these issues. Yet we witness government after government taking foreign policy positions detrimental to their interests.

What is apparent to an outside observer however is not necessarily clear to those who are operating on the ground. The decline in foreign policy performance is often a gradual process, with regressions starting small and gathering momentum as they expand in scope and effect. Larger problems do not manifest overnight, nor do they follow the simple formula outlined in the example of Fictionistan.

Instead, they accumulate gradually, as small regressions snowball into larger issues. This slow decline often goes unnoticed by those focused on achieving short-term objectives, leaving governments unaware of their policy’s inadequacies until significant damage has been done.

In organizational behavior models, particularly in large bureaucracies that feature established behavioral patterns such as ministries of foreign affairs, the lack of immediate repercussions as a result of complacency encourages further complacency. If there is no pressing need to change, why invest the time and resources, especially in rigidly bureaucratic contexts where it is difficult to justify the investment of time and effort without clearly identifiable returns. In such cases, reliance on old models and previously successful approaches become the norm. Bureaucratic inertia gives the appearance of progress and forward momentum even as the policy directions divert away from strategic goals.

Bureaucracies often prioritize stability over change, which can lead to a reluctance to innovate. Within foreign policy institutions, this inertia manifests as a preference for old models of engagement—tried and tested approaches that are deemed 'safe'—even when they are no longer effective in a shifting international context.

Causes and Features

One of the common causes of regressing foreign policy is caused by a trickledown effect of reduced focus on updating policy positions. Within governments this can include the full spectrum of leadership (head of government, ministers, and senior officials) or a segment of it. When it happens from top leadership however, it has the greatest impact. When heads of government deprioritize the role of their foreign affairs organizations, and prioritize their compliance rather than their insights, it can initiate the process of decline within the country’s foreign policy apparatus.

In terms of organizational behavior, valuing compliance rather than initiative frequently results in a progressive toxification of an organization’s culture (with the exception of specific types of organization such as military units, that are designed in that way for operational purposes). As leadership demands compliance, so too will their subordinates from their own team members, initiating a chain of compliance that replaces initiative, predictive analysis and creativity.

This progressively refocuses staff efforts towards maintaining their connections to leadership due to the rewards for compliance, creating an environment that fosters cronyism and discourages voicing dissent (interpreted contextually as non-compliance). When it comes to foreign affairs, a narrowly focused perspective that seeks to appease leadership cannot be expected to create strategies that suit the dynamically evolving international relations landscape.

Staff members, especially highly qualified personnel with extensive experience and expertise, resent being unheard and dismissed. The response to that is disengagement from the organization to varying degrees ranging from resignation of high calibers to simple refusal to invest time and effort into what is seen as futile process of voicing concern. From a focus on organizational and strategic goals, the priority becomes self-preservation and achievement of personal goals.

These factors combine over time to create an environment from which extracting valuable strategic insight becomes near impossible. The echo chamber that arises in this perfect storm of bureaucracy is like a stagnant pool of water disconnected from streams of ideas that would reinvigorate it.

Further adding to the echo chamber, ministries of foreign affairs are frequently hesitant about consulting with too many actors outside of the government; due to the sensitive nature of many of the topics covered under the foreign policy umbrella, governmental organizations operating within that sphere err on the side of caution when it comes to preserving confidentiality. While not unwarranted, the over implementation of this approach leads to a detachment of government organizations from sources of new ideas and inputs on portfolios.

This detachment can create ivory towers of policy formulation, detached from the resources, researches and insights that would otherwise be available to them through channels of communication with organizations outside their immediate circles. It limits perspective and insights, and instead of an organization poised to formulate policy, it becomes self-aggrandizing and subject to confirmation biases that reinforce its positions.

While many governments are susceptible to this decline, the degree of vulnerability varies based on factors such as leadership effectiveness, resource allocation, and historical context. In some cases, rather ironically, the notion of infallibility is what creates the vulnerability to the problem. Being a well-funded, transparent organization does not necessarily preclude from the risks of falling into the pattern of decline outlined above.

Identifying the Problem

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While we will discuss at length the issues related to identifying and addressing the issues in a separate piece, some of the more prominent identifiers are a noticeable increase in resignations from professionals on a year-to-year basis, a comparatively reduced rate of output, and a notable reduction in initiatives. 

Because it is a progressive issue, with a gradually declining curve, identification at early stages is often challenging. Gauging morale in a field of perpetually overworked and under resourced professionals that exist in a perpetual state of anxiety is not an exact science.

The problem becomes fairly easy to identify in its later stages -repeated failures to achieve policy goals, regression of international standing, regression of regional standing, loss of global or regional strategic positioning, etc.- but by then, the efforts required to address it are comprehensive and necessitate organization-wide changes in behavior and culture.

Early identification is imperative to preventing ballooning of the issues, and include deliberate policies to identify shifts in organizational culture and individual behavior on an organization wide basis. Ideally cyclical observation of these factors would be included as a part of institutional oversight to help pinpoint the beginnings of problems and the opportunity to address the challenges early on.

Conclusion

The consequences of declining foreign policy are not limited to immediate setbacks; they encompass long-term strategic disadvantages that could have far-reaching implications for national security, economic stability, and international influence. Governments should develop mechanisms that maintain their awareness to the problem, including metrics and indicators that would serve as early warnings of evolving problems.

Understanding that this problem is not simple to identify in its early stages, the systems that can help detect its presence should not be created ad hoc, but rather with a preemptive perspective. Ideally, indicators and metrics would be integrated with the broader systems of operational evaluators that exist in most ministries of foreign affairs.

There is also a paradoxical issue that comes with this problem, specifically that its identification requires that the organization's self-awareness is high enough to recognize its presence. Unfortunately, one of the symptoms of the problem is the lack of organizational self-awareness that results in the echo chamber referred to above.

It is a complex and nuanced issue, requiring considerable focus and prioritization on part of the decision makers. It requires both a forward looking approach and an organization's understanding of its own history and patterns. The investment of time and effort however is worth it; remaining aware of the potentiality provides guardrails against its occurrence, saving trouble down the road.

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