Diplomacy in Flux: Global Repercussions of the 2024 UNGA Palestine Resolution
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On the tenth of May, 2024, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution supporting Palestine’s bid for membership. Anticipating a negative outcome in the Security Council (UNSC), the UNGA granted Palestine exceptional status. This included alphabetical seating among member states and rights such as submitting proposals, amendments, and agenda items. In September, Palestine took its seat in the General Assembly.
At its tenth emergency session held on 17 and 18 September 2024, the UNGA adopted a resolution on the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and from the illegality of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
The resolution, in addition to tackling the persistent issues stemming from the Israeli Palestinian conflict, also addressed the specificities of the Israeli assault on Gaza. It stood out for a number of reasons, including its more comprehensive approach to matters of reparations and oversight mechanisms compared to previous resolutions, signaling shifting global attitudes on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The Resolution in Brief
This United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution addresses the illegality of Israel's actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, based on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued in July 2024. The ICJ found Israel’s ongoing occupation, settlement expansion, and annexation to be violations of international law, demanding an immediate end to these practices. The resolution stresses that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories, dismantle settlements and the separation wall, and cease all policies that have been characterized as discriminatory under international law, including racial segregation and apartheid.
The resolution further calls on member states and international organizations not to recognize or support activities that violate international law. It calls for sanctions, an end to trade with settlements, and clear distinctions in diplomatic, economic, and political dealings between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Additionally, the UNGA reaffirms the Palestinian right to self-determination and set a 12-month deadline for Israel to implement the recommendations.
The resolution proposes two conferences: one in Geneva for the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to enforce its provisions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and another during the 79th session of the General Assembly to implement relevant UN resolutions and advance the two-state solution.
Lastly, the resolution emphasizes the need for accountability, urging the creation of an international mechanism for reparations for the damages caused by Israel’s actions, while also calling for measures to prevent further violations of international law. It also requested that the Secretary General of the United Nations present a report to the General Assembly within a three-month deadline on the status of implementation or violation of this resolution.
This resolution’s demands have sparked varied reactions across the globe, reflected in the voting map that reveals both patterns of support and opposition.
Voting Map
With 124 votes in favor, support for the resolution follows near typical voting patterns on Palestine in the General Assembly. Apart from North America and Oceania, all other regions had significant representation in favor of the resolution.
As for abstentions, representation is less global. Only 7 African countries abstained, while Asia sported three abstentions, and Latin America had 4. The bulk of the abstentions was carried by Europe, featuring 21 abstentions.
The least representative group was that of the countries that voted against the resolution. In addition to Israel and the United States, there were only one African country, two Latin American countries, and two European countries that voted no, with the bulk of the votes (seven of the fourteen) coming from Oceania.
The distribution of votes reveals key trends. These highlight bloc and regional dynamics and suggest where support for or resistance to the resolution’s implementation may emerge in the coming months.
Observing EU voting trends, we find that thirteen of the twenty seven member states supported the resolution, with two votes against and twelve abstentions. Notably, of the EU members who abstained or voted against the resolution, seven recognize Palestine. Within NATO, over half of the members either abstained (fifteen) or voted against the resolution (three), while the remaining fourteen voted in favor.
Looking at these two blocs together given their significant overlap in membership, it is worth noting that the split between support and abstentions and opposition is becoming more significant within EU and NATO members.
Moving onto G7 voting trend on this resolution, we find that of the seven, only two voted in support of the resolution (France and Japan), while four abstained and the United States voted against. The trend therefore within the G7 is not in favor of the resolution.
On the G20 front, more than half of the member states of the G20 supported the resolution, with two voting against and six abstaining.
As for the African Union, we have the vast majority voting in support, with 7 abstentions and one opposing vote (Malawi), reflecting continent-wide support for the resolution as has been the case persistently on resolutions regarding the recognition of Palestine. Worthy of note that 50 African countries recognize Palestine as a state and therefore there are no surprises in this voting pattern.
Considering BRICS, as an emerging bloc with significant economic and growing political clout, it is worthy of note that two of the nine members abstained (Ethiopia and India), representing over 20% of the membership. While BRICS is primarily an economic group, the lack of cohesion in the vote suggests that coordinated economic action among its members would be challenging.
Another organization worthy of note due to its growing membership and increasing spheres of influence is the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) that includes ten member states and twenty states that have the status of dialogue partner or observer within the organization. Of this roster, two members abstained, one did not vote (Afghanistan) and the remainder supported.
Another interesting bloc to observe are the CARICOM countries, all of whom as of May of 2024 recognize Palestine as a state. Of the CARICOM members of the UN, all but one voted in support of this resolution.
Within G77, the Arab League, and the OIC there the widespread support for this resolution is unsurprising; it follows prior voting patterns.
We note therefore that the resolution garnered widespread support from the Global South, with notable backing from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Meanwhile, opposition primarily came from North America and Oceania, with the U.S. and Israel as key dissenters. The European Union and NATO showed a significant split, with a mix of votes in favor, abstentions, and opposition. Despite this division, a large number of states—including G20 members and emerging blocs like BRICS—support Palestine's right to self-determination, signaling a growing global consensus against the status quo, even in traditionally cautious regions.
Voting Trend Analysis
The significance of votiong trends stems not only from the number of votes, but also from the resolution itself. Whereas the voting trends fall within the margins of previous resolutions on the Israel-Palestine issue, the resolution is more assertive in its demands for concrete steps. The increased focus on action, including reparations and follow-up mechanisms, as well as the broad support for convening a conference on holding an international conference on the implementation of the fourth Geneva convention are all reflective of a shift in the tide of global opinion.
In 2024 alone, nine additional states, including four European states, four Caribbean states, and Armenia recognized Palestine, with the King of Spain accepting the credentials of the first full Palestinian ambassador to Spain one day before the vote. With these states, the number of member states of the UN that recognize Palestine rises to 146.
Global voting trends and regional groupings indicate that resistance to the status quo is no longer confined to traditional circles and is expanding across broader sectors. Most regional blocs, with few exceptions most notably NATO and the EU, reflect within them broad support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and accountability for violations of international law.
This resolution, based on the advisory opinion of the ICJ, ties in with the efforts of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to seek arrest warrants for Israeli officials accused of war crimes.
While many of the countries that voted in favor of the resolution have existing ideological motivations to support it, there are those whose concern stems from worries regarding the state of international law and the potential unravelling of the multilateral system as it exists. The persistent disregard for international law and the advisory opinion of the highest international court are viewed by many as setting concerning precedents that will pave the way for other actors to employ similar methods and justifications in the near future.
Furthermore, from a realpolitik perspective, there are concerns about gathering global support on other issues, particularly the Russia–Ukraine war. Across the Global South, most of whom recognize Palestine and view the Israeli onslaught as an egregious violation of international law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law, there is rising discontent with what is viewed as stark double standard among EU and NATO members. The dissonance between the approach of NATO and EU countries to the two conflicts in parallel has elicited opposition to EU and NATO positions, a matter that Russia has leveraged to its advantage through its membership in various blocs, including G20, BRICS, and the SCO among others.
The voting map illustrates that lines have blurred; even among those that abstained or opposed, many recognize the state of Palestine. That could indicate that the resolution is considered by those states to be unusually forceful, but despite their abstention on the vote they nevertheless recognize the right to self determination of the Palestinian people. These blurred lines are also visible within the EU and NATO, where a number of member states recognized Palestine in 2024.
On the other hand, the blurred lines also appear within the EU and NATO, where three member states recognized Palestine this year alone, bringing the total number to ten out of twenty-seven.
With the majority of the G20 members, and a number of EU and NATO states supporting the resolution, in addition to the broad support in other regional groups, we find that the principal opposition resides within the membership of G7, followed by NATO and the EU, with the focal point of opposition being the US.
With this broad support spread throughout different geographical regions, blocs, and groups despite the more proactive tone of the resolution, follow through and continued engagement on the matter on the international level may be expected to gather momentum over the coming months.
Potential Outcomes (I): Recommendations of the Resolution
Continued opposition from the U.S., G7 countries, and a significant portion of NATO and the EU suggests that implementing the resolution’s recommendations could face substantial challenges.
Conferences
The two conferences called for in this resolution, namely “the international conference under the auspices of the Assembly for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions pertaining to the question of Palestine and the two-State solution for the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East,” and the “Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to ensure respect thereof in accordance with common article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions” will likely face staunch opposition.
The former will likely follow precedent, and under the auspices of the UNGA reemphasize the necessity of implementing the relevant resolutions, and provide additional recommendations on the mechanisms referred to in this resolution. It could potentially result in the establishment of an agency or envoy position to pursue the implementation of these resolutions. However, it is likely that whatever mechanism emerges will be toothless in terms of enforcing any real steps or consequences upon the government of Israel; with the unequivocable support of the US for Israel and its persistent opposition to imposing consequences upon it regardless of its actions, it is unlikely that any UN agency or envoy would be able to overcome this challenge in the short term.
Additionally, the US, if pressed, could take actions such as witholding funding from the UN if its positions continue to be challenged, particularly if it witnesses a change of government in its presidential elections in November. In that case, the UN would be hard pressed to implement any recommendations resulting from this or other resolutions.
As for the second conference bringing together the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention (all the member states of the UN in addition to Palestine and the Vatican), this would be the fourth such conference to be held since 1949, and notably all previous iterations also tackled the issue of the Palestinian territories.
The previous iterations, in 1999, 2001, and 2014 convened on the matter and in 1999 the outcome document was a statement reaffirming the applicability of the Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In 2001 and 2014 the outcomes were declarations that expressed concern about the status of the humanitarian situation in Palestine, and reaffirmed the applicability of the Convention, calling on the parties to respect the Geneva Conventions and on the Occupying power to refrain from perpetrating violations against civilians and protected persons.
The conferences, while important in legal terms in reaffirming the applicability of the Conventions, and therefore the accountability of violators, did little to impact the realities on the ground where the conflict proceeded without any course corrections.
The difference however in this conference and its potential impact may arise as a result of provisions contained in the resolution itself pertaining to accountability.
Accountability
Paragraphs nine through eleven of the resolution refer to the accountability of Israel for violations of international law, including the need for a mechanism for reparation for damages, which would be recorded through a ‘register of damage’ to serve as evidence of violations. They further refer to the need for independent investigations and prosecutions against perpetrators of any violations of international law.
These paragraphs, in conjunction with the advisory opinion of the ICJ, the pursuit by the prosecutor of the ICC for arrest warrants for several Israeli officials, and the outcomes of the as yet to be held Conference of the High Contracting Parties form the strands of an emerging legal framework. If persistently applied, and with sufficient follow through, the legal foundation for the pursuit of the most egregious violators of international law could be laid.
However, this outcome is far from ideal as far as Israel is concerned, and could also put the US in an even more precarious position relative to international legal standards; having a legal foundation of this sort could limit its ability to legitimize its political support for Israel within the multilateral legal system . This predicates maneuvers on the part of the US, which could include preempting convening this conference, as well as pressuring those within its sphere of influence to avoid attending. It could also leverage its influence among members states to derail the outcomes of the conference if it were convened, seeking an outcome similar to that of the conference of 1999 which was ineffectual, and failed to address any real concerns or impact any realities on the ground.
To supplement the matter of accountability, the resolution called upon the Secretary General of the UN to submit a report on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution, or lack thereof, ensuring persistent observation of developments on the ground.
Follow Up Mechanisms
The resolution’s call for establishing an international mechanism for reparation of all damage, including an international register to serve as a record of evidence, as well as the launching of fair and independent investigations and prosecutions serves as indicators of the frustration with the current mechanisms and processes.
Those proposed mechanisms, as well as the report to be submitted by the Secretary General of the UN on the progression of implementation add impetus to the resolution. They provide time frames delineating the pace of progress, and provide member states with the tools to pursue implementation. Whether or not states choose to do so is another question given the non binding nature of the resolution.
Like the proposed conferences, establishing these mechanisms may prove more challenging than the resolution suggests. While there is broad support for the resolution in the UNGA as reflected in the voting map above, the major contributors to the budget of the UN are concentrated within the groups where opposition to the resolution stems (members of the G7 that opposed or abstained on the resolution alone account for nearly 40% of the UN yearly budget). That means that in practical terms, they could refuse to allocate or earmark funds for the establishment and running of these mechanisms, or hamstring them through procedural conditions so as to make them ineffective at securing any effective impact.
Therefore, while the resolution theoretically provides for implementing and follow-up mechanisms, navigating the organizational hurdles imposed by member states that oppose the resolution may prove difficult.
Beyond legal and procedural mechanisms, the resolution also touches on economic actions that could directly affect Israel's economy. These measures have the potential to impose tangible consequences for violations.
Economic Repercussions
The resolution specifically calls upon states and those that fall under their jurisdiction to, in respect of international law, not to recognize or support the persistence of the occupation. This included specific allusions to ensuring the cessation of economic engagement through trade that would aid illegal settlements, including provision of arms that could reasonably be suspected of being used in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Furthermore, it calls for sanctioning entities and persons engaged in maintaining of Israel’s unlawful presence in the Occupied Territories.
If implemented, these measures—supported by 124 countries—could have significant economic consequences for Israel. This would be particularly true if the legal repercussions arising from these paragraphs took legal form, and reflected in economic impact on companies through lawsuits or other actions that impacted their revenues. Even with the support of the G7 and the EU members that opposed this resolution, a global implementation of the provisions of this resolution would incur considerable economic effects on Israel.
However, the likelihood of broad implementation of these elements of the resolution may not manifest immediately, or at all. The resolution, given that it was adopted by the General Assembly, and considered a recommendation rather than a legally binding document, gives significant leeway to member states as far as implementation. Therefore, it will come down to a matter of interests versus voluntary adherence to the resolution’s recommendations.
Economic consequences, however, are just one part of the broader political equation. The political fallout from the resolution will be shaped by both regional dynamics and global power struggles, as we will now explore.
Potential Outcomes (II): The Political Landscape
On the political level, the dynamics reflected within this resolution are reflective of the global political landscape. Israel’s growing isolation is reflected in the more expcitly direct language used in the resolution as opposed to previous ones, including references to establishing mechanisms, pursuing prosecution for violations and seeking reparations for damages caused by Israeli violations in the Occupied Territories. While many of those elements have featured in previous resolutions, they were either narrow in scope (the damages caused by the separation wall for instance) or more vague in terms of implementation mechanisms.
In stark contrast to the status of Israel prior to October 2023 where discussions were heading toward regional integration in the Middle East, Israel is regionally ostracized and isolated. Its relations with a number of African countries, most notably South Africa, have soured considerably as have its relations with a number of European states that have become increasingly critical of Israel’s campaign, as evidenced not only by strained relations but by the recognitions of Palestine this year.
The language used, including references to mechanisms and pursuit of legal action against violators, point towards mounting frustration with the pattern of support for Israel in disregard of its violations of international law, and the potential consequences of persistent violations of international legal norms.
That frustration and concern are not necessarily exclusively attached to Israel, but also to how the precedents set in this conflict will affect future state behavior. If egregious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law can be excused for one actor, the likelihood of recurrence of similar actions by others increases.
This concern is not limited to the Global South, but appears to have spread to members of the EU and NATO, who could be concerned that fraying the rules-based order could incur serious consequences down the line. If actors no longer view the international legal order as relevant, applicable or enforceable, they are more likely to engage in behavior that violates it in pursuit of their interests.
The methodology employed by Israel in its campaign against Palestine has created an environment where it is increasingly politically disadvantageous for regional partners to engage with its government, and has tested the limits of US influence on regional states. Whereas the US has publicly pursued a strategy of mediating normalizing relations between Israel and its neighbors, most prominently Saudi Arabia, the latter has recently publicly stated its opposition to establishing any ties with Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state.
On the other hand, and despite the increasing influence of actors outside the G7 and NATO on the international stage, the influence of the US as the primary global superpower remains substantial. It is also supplemented by unwavering support from other states that wield considerable influence. This collection of countries opposes any concrete steps taken against the government of Israel for various political, strategic, and economic reasons. They will therefore be expected to engage through their spheres of influence to contain any potential spillover effects arising as a result of this resolution.
The successful legal pursuit of Israel, especially if through mechanisms established under the auspices of the UN will be symbolic of a shift of global power dynamics. It would herald waning influence and power of traditionally prominent actors, as well as the potential increased vulnerability of traditionally insulated states when they engage in activities outside the parameters of international law.
Furthermore, the presence of concrete steps against Israel, particularly legal ones that address issues such as prohibiting trade in weapons and providing support for Israel in activities that could reasonably be viewed as entrenching the occupation (in violation of international law) would be uncomfortably restraining for countries with strategic and security interests tied to those activities. Weapons exports to Israel for instance could be challenged at every occasion, with the argument being that any weapon exported to Israel could arguably be used to entrench its occupation of Palestinian territories.
Additionally, activities such as joint training and exercises, exchange of intelligence and broad security cooperation could find itself under undue scrutiny, an unacceptable outcome for actors with strategic interests in the region, who have traditionally been free to operate with few if any restraints.
As the resolution continues to shape international responses, its broader symbolic and practical impacts will depend on the willingness of states to take meaningful action; while the resolution marks a significant shift, the road ahead remains fraught with challenges.
Conclusion
Although the resolution’s symbolic impact and Palestine’s exceptional status in the UNGA are significant, it is unlikely to create immediate changes on the ground. The conferences called for within the resolution, if they are held, will likely witness stalling and get ground to a halt through the maneuvers of states opposing or abstaining on this resolution. The outcomes of these conferences, as well as the reports to be submitted by the United Nations Secretary General will serve as records of global trends, but will likely falter when it comes to enforcing steps on the ground.
In the same vein, mechanisms that are to be established to follow up on the violations by Israel, as well as the efforts to pursue international legal action against those responsible for actions that breach international law, are unlikely to have significant impact on the conflict. They will be met with resistance at every step by states opposing this resolution. These states, that among them account for a considerable percentage of the UN budget, will likely wield both political and administrative tools at their disposal to neutralize the implementation of the resolution. On the administrative side, they might be disinclined to finance these mechanisms or procedures, and on the political side could lobby other states to adopt similar positions, essentially hamstringing them from the get go.
Considering the potential legal repercussions for Israel and its partners, they may seek preempt any legal actions or precedents from being set. For Israeli officials the precedent set by any successful legal case would prove problematic as it would not only limit their international engagement with potential partners, but would also affect their ability to pursue their strategic objectives in the Occupied Territories and limit their options on the internal front. Israel’s partners, especially those engaged in trade and security cooperation would also be expected to oppose setting any legal precedents that limit their strategic interests on bilateral or regional levels.
Despite the challenges regarding the implementation of several aspects of the resolution, particularly those tied to collective action under the auspices of intergovernmental and multilateral work, there are elements within the resolution that states can choose to implement independently. Those, including the recommendation to sanction trade with settlements, can be implemented individually by states without consultation with other actors. The extent to which the resolution affects engagement with Israel will reflect the real rather than symbolic support for the resolution.
On individual state levels, there have already been important changes over the past months, including recognition of Palestine by nine countries in 2024 (making it the most significant year in terms of recognitions since 2011). These recognitions included four CARICOM countries (setting the recognition rate of Palestine within the bloc at 100%), and three EU countries. Following through with this trend, and noting that a significant percentage of countries within the EU and NATO do not recognize settlements and expansions beyond the 1967 borders as Israeli, the potential exists for further steps such as more proactive pursuit of sanctions against economic activity that enables settlements.
The trend toward more support for Palestine and opposition to Israeli violations may benefit from increased momentum in the wake of the adoption of this resolution, particularly if the conferences that it called for are held. During the coming period, the maneuvering on generating support for further steps included in the resolution could accelerate, with supporters seeking avenues to ensure implementation and detractors seeking ways to limit effects and outcomes.
While the issue itself is contentious, one of the main drivers of the debate among supporters and detractors is the applicability and universality of international law, and the preservation of a rules based order that provides a framework for a stable global system. Governments are eyeing with growing concern the mounting frustration with the current order, and are considering scenarios where this mounting frustration reaches a tipping point among enough governments that it may reshape global consensus on the applicability of international law.
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