After Assad: Power Shifts and the Struggle for Syria’s Future
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This special edition delves into the rapid and dramatic developments in Syria, culminating in the collapse of the Assad regime after over five decades in power. In it I explore the immediate and far-reaching repercussions of this monumental shift for Syria and the broader Middle East.
On December 8, the Assad family’s 54-year reign ended as rebel forces entered Damascus, marking a seismic shift for Syria and the Middle East.
Brief background
On November 27, a coalition of factions launched a surprise joint operation, ‘Deterrence of Aggression,’ in northeastern Syria. Under the leadership of Ahmed El Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohamed El Golani, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) spearheaded a rapid and coordinated advance, capturing key towns and villages across Idlib province. By November 29, they had entered Aleppo—Syria’s second-largest city—and taken control of key military bases on its outskirts, marking the most coordinated and rapid rebel advance in over a decade. The factions subsequently captured Hama, Deir al-Zor, and Aleppo before advancing to Homs and, ultimately, Damascus.
Weakened by waning support from Hezbollah, that has been embroiled in the war with Israel for the past year, the reduced focus of Russia on Syria as it prioritizes the Ukraine front, and the diminished Iranian support both as a result of its skirmishes with Israel and its political realignment, Assad’s regime found itself on the defensive and out of options as Assad and his family departed to safety.
The Syrian military, outdated in operational capabilities, overly reliant on external support, and archaic in its methods, found itself facing a new hybrid force of fighters, supported either directly or indirectly by various international and regional actors, chief among them Türkiye, that sought a solution to the 3.5 million Syrian immigrants/refugees it has within its borders, and to the ongoing threat posed by the porous Syrian-Turkish borders.
The fighting was limited, and support from both Iran and Russia for Assad’s government was little more that posturing, while the operational directives for both those actors seemed focused on securing their own prerogatives in the wake of the inevitable collapse of the Assad regime.
From initial appearances, it seems that the concerned parties, Türkiye, Iran and Russia, had predetermined that Assad would fall. His intransigence and refusal to negotiate on normalization with Türkiye, his reduced control over his weakened military establishment reduced his relevance and usefulness to his supporters, tipped the balance toward betting on the risky alternative of allowing the rebel forces to take control of Syria.
With Russia granting Assad and his family asylum, and the fact it received guarantees regarding its interests -military installations and representation offices, in addition to the very limited fighting during the advance of the opposition forces, several elements point to the possibility that a deal had been brokered leading up to this outcome.
It appears that this agreement was been reached between Türkiye, the rebels, the Assad government and the Russians, that in exchange for the safety of Assad and the assurances of no revenge killings against his Alawy clan, the government would not pose too much resistance to the advance of the rebels.
Further pointing toward this possibility are the statements by El Sharaa regarding keeping the government in place as an interim and ensuring a smooth transition. There further seems to have been some form of cooperation between members of the security forces and the rebels to allow for smooth progression throughout Syria as events progressed.
The swift collapse of Assad’s forces has opened a new chapter in Syria’s long and tumultuous history, setting the stage for intense regional maneuvering.
Regional and International Impact
1- Turkey
Turkey’s push for normalization with Syria over the past year faced significant roadblocks due to Assad’s refusal to engage and Iran’s competing interests. With the fall of Assad, Ankara sees an opportunity to reshape its relationship with Syria and achieve two critical objectives: securing its borders and addressing the refugee crisis. For Türkiye the toppling of the Assad regime is a welcome outcome, preferable to the continued presence of an uncooperative government unwilling to engage on negotiations with Türkiye.
A new Syrian government, indebted to Türkiye’s support, is likely to align with Ankara’s strategic goals, particularly in securing borders and curbing Kurdish militant activity. Turkey has stated that it supports the national unity and cohesion and territorial integrity of Syria and called on all actors to refrain from actions that would result in destabilization and break out of new conflicts. In all likelihood, Türkiye will emerge as the key power broker capable of engaging with the new government in Syria, given that it was viewed as the primary supporter for the operations of the rebel -now governmental- forces that deposed Assad’s government.
2- Russia
For Russia, Syria is its regional foothold. Nowhere else in the Middle East does Russia have the extent of influence that it does in Syria; while it has an alliance of sorts with Iran, its relationship with Syria is critical to its regional influence and power projection in the resource rich and strategically positioned region. It also represents an important partner in a region heavily dominated by U.S. alliances, and provides Russia with access to the Mediterranean, military airbases, and a context to test and showcase its weapons. It also represents -as it does for Iran- and important alternative path for gas and energy pipelines.
The fall of Assad’s government reduces Russian influence and power projection in the region, essentially relegating it to the outskirts of a region that is mostly connected to the U.S. and the west. Despite the decisions of various regional actors, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to hedge their bets by aligning with BRICS an exerting a modicum of foreign policy independence through their ties to China and the Global South, they remain predominantly reliant on the U.S. for a number of key issues, prime among them security. The collapse of Assad’s regime creates a vacuum that Türkiye, NATO, and the U.S. are poised to fill, diminishing Russia’s regional clout.
Assad’s fall also has the additional potential domino effect of deterring other Russia backed regimes to rethink their positions; if Russia proves unable of protecting its allies, then being allied to Russia would be a bad investment for any government. This includes Iran, that might rethink not its connection to Russia as well: if Russia is unable to prevent the fall of Assad’s government in the face of an asymmetrical threat, then it would be incapable of doing much to prevent a more organized force from threating Iran’s interests.
However, there are some indicators that show that Russia’s support for Assad waned significantly over the course of the past weeks, and a recalculation on the part of Russian strategists seems to have favored allowing the collapse of the Assad government rather than keep investing into a sinking ship. Russia provided limited aerial support, even as it withdrew its more considerable weight from the fight, issuing statements at various points indicating that if Syrian forces withdrew it would not provide support, and relocating some of its vessels present in Syrian ports.
Russia’s recalibrated strategy focuses on securing its foothold in Syria by building alliances with the incoming government rather than investing in Assad’s collapsed regime -despite offering Assad's family asylum. While its focal point had been Assad himself and those directly around him, Russia’s connections were not limited to those individuals and remains pervasive and important throughout the country, and may prove critical for the opposition to maintain its hold over the country in the face of Israeli encroachment on Syrian territory and the expected U.S. attempts to guide the narrative in a direction that favors Israel and U.S. interests: while there is no love lost between Golani and Russians, he was imprisoned by the U.S. forces in Iraq and holds no love for them either.
Noticeably, as of this morning Russian media began referring to the opposition forces as factions rather than terrorist groups, indicating a possible shift in its modus operandi regarding the opposition. There are already open channels of communication between Russia and the new de facto government in Syria, lending further credence to the notion that Russia purposely allowed Assad to fall and reinvested in its relationship with the incoming government.
In broader terms, Assad’s fall could impact Russia’s credibility elsewhere. Current partners and allies may see Russia as being in a weakened position that is not capable of providing support, therefore incentivizing allies reliant on their connections to Russia to consider alternatives. Even Iran may find itself reconsidering its reliance on and alliance with a Russia incapable of projecting its power on a global scale, and therefore unable to provide a security umbrella. This is despite statements by officials close to the Russian government stating that one of the reasons that Bashar’s government fell was his failure to heed Russia’s warning or follow its advice.
3- Israel
Israel has already mobilized its forces to seize upon the instability in the country, making incursions against various weapons facilities in the country to limit the rebel forces’ access to the weapons systems left behind by the toppled government. Netanyahu has also declared that the 1974 Agreement between Syria and Israel on Disengagement to be void and is moving to secure a buffer zone in Syrian territory. In doing so however, Israel claimed this to be a temporary measure rather than a permanent state of affairs, stating that it would claim the buffer zone in the interim period to ensure the safety of northern Israel.
While the fall of Assad’s regime, as the regional extension of Iran’s influence in the Arab world and one of the tools of Iran’s power projection is welcome for Israel, the incoming opposition forces hold their own enmity toward Israel; Al Golani’s nom de guerre stems from his origins in the occupied Syrian Golan heights, and part of his legitimacy stems from his political Islamic foundation. He therefore brings another set of variables into the equation, including aspirations to liberating the occupied Syrian Golan heights, support for other Islamist political groups in the region and a government potentially less influenced by external interests than Assad’s. A more independent Syria, or even a Syria more friendly toward Türkiye may not be an ideal outcome for Israel, given the political antipathy between Türkiye and Israel at the moment.
Netanyahu stated that the fall of Assad may spur new life into negotiations regarding the remaining hostages in Gaza, a statement that on the face of it seems geared toward raising the oncoming U.S. administration’s hopes for a settlement, rather than rooted in any reality on the ground at least at the moment.
Israel’s actions underscore its intentions to maintain a strategic advantage in the region, though tensions with the new Syrian government could escalate if it does not scale back its operations.
4- Iran
Iran emerges as the greatest loser from this sudden collapse of the Assad government. As its primary supporter, it lost an important geostrategic ally, and an important pathway to the mediterranean, a geographic access point for its transfer of weapons to its Hezbollah allies, and an important buffer zone against its regional ideological rivals.
It appears that Iran, like Russia, predicted the fall of the regime, as signaled by the very limited support that it provided to the collapsed regime. Rather than invest more in a regime that no longer had control over the security apparatus -the Syrian army and security forces retreated in the face of the factions with very limited engagement- it appears to have recalculated its options and sought to redirect its focus elsewhere: there was no longer a reason to keep betting on a losing horse.
In all likelihood, Iran’s supporters will go underground and seek to redesign their networks within the new reality. A full withdrawal is unlikely, rather a redesigned and reimagined method of engagement with the existing networks is more likely to appear, something that will be confronted by the new ruling class, who will be seeking to reimagine the Syrian Iranian relationship. Iran may intensify covert operations, leveraging proxies to maintain influence, or seek direct engagement with Türkiye to counterbalance its reduced presence in Syria.
5- The U.S.
For the U.S. the fall of Assad could be a bittersweet outcome. On the one hand, the fall of Assad signals to the world that Russia is an unreliable partner and ally, and that counting on Russia is a failing long-term strategy. it would also reinforce US influence and presence in the region, alienate Iran further and consolidate U.S. hegemony over a region over which it already has substantial control. If the new government that comes into place is friendly toward the U.S., it would have effective geopolitical leverage over a continuous landmass extending from Egypt to Iraq, effectively booting Russia out, and isolating Iran.
However, the U.S. is looking carefully at what could happen in the aftermath of the fall of Assad; at the helm of the opposition forces that took control of the country is Ahmed El Sharaa aka Abu Mohamed El Golani, a former Al Qaeda and ISIS operative who broke off and formed his own faction in the levant. He has been a prisoner of the U.S forces in Iraq, and upon his release, he went to Syria and fought against Assad’s forces in the wake of the 2011 revolution.
The ideal scenario for the U.S. is holding elections, and the formation of a government with elements of the Syrian exiles within it over whom it would have considerably more influence that the current formation. Currently, the leading international actor with real influence on the ground remains Türkiye.
A government led by anti-Iran and anti U.S. factions may not be ideal, but the outcome of a destabilized and weakened Syria remains a welcome one for the outgoing U.S. administration, that could seize upon the opportunity to fill the vacuum regardless of existing sentiments; as the most dominant super power in the region, it remains an important guarantor of security, and could offer the incoming Syrian government assurances of reigning in potential Israeli aggression in exchange for more influence over its policies, including those affecting the energy and reconstruction sectors.
The U.S. has already stated that it will engage with all stakeholders for the future of Syria for the transition period in the wake of Assad’s collapse, and that it will keep what forces it has there due to their importance in dealing with ISIL, and that it has already begun discussions with Türkiye on the future of Syria. It has stated the HTS has taken positive steps recently, signaling that discussions with them and regard for their interests is not off the table. It has also assured that it does not predict using direct force to destroy the chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria.
While the U.S. has noted recent positive steps by HTS, the group’s controversial past as a former Al-Qaeda affiliate complicates potential engagement. The U.S. stands at a crossroads: it can either capitalize on Assad’s fall to reassert regional dominance or risk alienating the new Syrian government through overreach.
6- Europe
Europe remains relatively sidelined by these developments, and while several countries and the EU expressed their welcome for the fall of the Assad, the European role remains fairly marginal. One of the issues that most deeply concerns Europe in a direct manner are the worries about a potential influx of refugees from Syria like that of 2015.
For Europe, the stability of Syria spells a possible return of numerous refugees, and stemming the flow of another surge in their number as had been the fear when the fighting broke out two weeks ago. The fighting resurfaced the risks of another wave of refugees moving through Türkiye toward Europe increased, and with the quick fall of Assad, this concern appears to be somewhat reduced. This will remain true unless the factions themselves break out into a new round of fighting over ruling the country, a matter which could reignite European concerns.
The fall of Assad presents a renewed opportunity for Europe in the form of reduced Iranian influence over an important pathway for energy corridors to Europe, particularly gas flows from the Gulf north to Türkiye and the Mediterranean to enter European markets, weakening the chokehold of Russian gas, and reducing reliance on American liquified natural gas in the future.
7- China
China’s response has been muted so far. It has expressed its support for a stable Syria and emphasizing the importance of the safety of Chinese nationals in Syria. China had maintained support for the Assad regime for a long time, even offering diplomatic cover in multilateral contexts, and working with the Assad government to reconstruct the war-torn country. China has often criticized foreign interference in Syria and stated its support for a stable and unified country.
Chinese pragmatism will likely continue in the same vein, pivoting to cooperation with the new government as it forms and ensuring the continued and sustained presence during the transitional phase, including through a possible reconstruction and stabilization phase that could ensue in the event of a stable government forming within Syria.
China presents a potential alternative to either the starkly pro-Israel U.S. or the pro Assad Russia for any upcoming government as it looks for partners moving forward. When it comes to development projects, China has perfected their approach to development projects in the realms of infrastructure and telecommunications; they are far less politically charged and come with fewer strings than similar proposals from western governments, many of whom categorize the figures involved in the deposition of Assad as terrorist organizations.
China’s muted response reflects its cautious pragmatism, as it balances maintaining ties with Syria’s new leadership while avoiding entanglement in the region’s politics.
What's Next?
With the euphoria of victory still in the air, it is difficult to tell which way the wind will blow. Already, Ahmed El Sharaa has shifted his discourse to a statesman tune, focusing on the Syrian state and the formation of a government geared towards the fulfillment of Syrian aspirations. He has repeatedly dismissed notions of expanding his focus to beyond Syria’s borders, and attempted to assure international actors, prime among them the U.S. and the west on his intentions. He has spoken of a new inclusive Islamist governance approach, one that does not target minorities or ideological rivals stating that Syria under this governance would be inclusive of all its citizens.
He further instructed his followers to not engage in revenge killings against the former ruling Alawy faction affiliated with Assad, in a move designed to prevent infighting to break out in the aftermath of the fall of the regime.
This stage is a precarious one, with the multitude of factions involved in the deposition of the government, the potential for intersectional fighting could remain high, and if not held in check could simply devolve into a new civil war between the victorious factions seeking to position themselves at the helm of the new Syrian government.
If however this is prevented, there are further challenges, chief among them deciding on the way forward. Already there are calls for implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 2254 adopted in 2015 calling for a political transition with an inclusive nonsectarian government, drafting a new constitution, and elections, along with the prevention of terrorist and violent acts and creating the conditions for the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons.
This is unlikely to be welcomed by the de facto government due to fears of foreign interference in the process attempting to shape the future of Syria according to the interests of foreign actors rather than their own, particularly given the designation of several members of the government including the de facto leader as terrorists. In case of holding elections, they may find themselves not only outside the government but facing prison terms.
As actors, internal and external, position themselves to maximize their gains, the U.S. and Türkiye appear to be the key actors in this particular development, and they have both indicated their readiness to engage with all actors and stakeholders within Syria. With a plethora of priorities and diverging interests, the question of the future of Syria remains open: will it be another civil war? Will it fall to political infighting? Will a new and inclusive Syria form? Will an independent country capable of forging its own future and protecting its own interests develop? Will another state paralyzed by internal political differences emerge? Or will another government propped up by foreign influence take place of the Assad regime?
The winds of change blow strong. The choices made in the coming weeks will determine whether Syria’s future is one of stability or renewed chaos.
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